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ABSTRACT
We adopt a general equilibrium approach in order to measure the effects of recent immigration on
the Western German labor market, looking at both wage and employment effects. Using the Regional
File of the IAB Employment Subsample for the period 1987-2001, we find that the substantial immigration
of the 1990's had no adverse effects on native wages and employment levels. It had instead adverse
employment and wage effects on previous waves of immigrants. This stems from the fact that, after
controlling for education and experience levels, native and migrant workers appear to be imperfect
substitutes whereas new and old immigrants exhibit perfect substitutability. Our analysis suggests
that if the German labor market were as 'flexible' as the UK labor market, it would be more efficient





















gperi@ucdavis.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Within Europe, Germany hosts the largest number of foreign individuals—workers with foreign
origin have represented more than 10% of the total German labor force since the late 1990’s.1 The
socioeconomic worries produced by rising immigration led the German government to introduce a
selective immigration system based on quotas, which was passed by the parliament but declared
void by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2002. In 2004 a comprehensive Immigration Act
introduced the possibility for immigrant workers to change their temporary residence permit to an
unlimited one after having paid at least 60 monthly contributions to social security, provided that
they pass a German language proﬁciency test.2
German labor market institutions are characterized by generous unemployment beneﬁts and
wage rigidities, which increase the potential for negative employment consequences due to immigra-
tion: newcomers and, in general, immigrants are more likely to stay jobless as wages do not adjust
to shocks. Such institutional features, speciﬁc to Germany, prevent the possibility of analyzing the
labor market impact of immigrants using a straightforward extension of recent analyses that focus
on the United States (Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2008), the United Kingdom (Manacorda
et al., 2006) or Israel (Friedberg, 2001). Those countries all have more ﬂexible labor markets,
lower hiring and ﬁring costs and less generous unemployment insurance vis-a-vis Germany. Two
considerations, however, emerge from those studies that should inform the analysis of the eﬀects
of immigration in Germany. First, the eﬀects of immigration depend on the composition of native
and immigrant workers, in terms of education and experience, and not just on the overall inﬂow of
immigrants. In the case of Germany, this is stressed by De New and Zimmermann (1994) who ana-
lyze the wage eﬀects of immigration to Germany for the 1984-1989 period. Segmenting the national
labor market across industries, these authors ﬁnd that immigrant workers substitute for unskilled
natives and complement skilled natives. Second, and less obvious, is that even after controlling for
education and experience, native and immigrant workers may not be perfectly substitutable.
Certainly the labor market eﬀects of immigration are sensitive to the institutional setup.3
For instance, the importance of labor market institutions in mediating the eﬀects of immigration
on wages and employment is stressed by Angrist and Kugler (2003). For a panel of European
Economic Area countries for 1983-1999, the authors show that labor market rigidities cause adverse
employment eﬀects. This ﬁnding echoes the results of Pischke and Velling (1997) who, using data
1Authors’ calculation using the IAB data introduced in section 4.
2See Zimmermann et al. (2007) for an outline and an economic evaluation of the norms contained in the Immi-
gration Act.
3For a theoretical model in which labor market institutions prevent wages from falling to their market clearing
level when immigration occurs, see Schmidt et al. (1994).
2on 167 German regions for the 1985-1989 period, show some evidence of the displacement of the
native workforce by immigration. More recently, Glitz (2006) analyzes the speciﬁci s s u eo ft h e
impact of ethnic German immigration on the relative skill-speciﬁc employment and wage rates of
the resident population in diﬀerent geographic areas between 1996 and 2001. He ﬁnds evidence of
adverse employment eﬀects but no detrimental eﬀects on average wages.
The present paper investigates the interactions between immigration, employment and wages
in Western Germany using the more structural labor market equilibrium approach recently em-
ployed in several national studies (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007; Borjas, 2003; Manacorda et al., 2006;
Ottaviano and Peri, 2008). This approach is based on the aforementioned idea that the average
and distributive eﬀects of immigration depend on the exact composition of native and immigrant
workers in terms of education and experience. This requires a careful estimation of the substitu-
tion elasticities between diﬀerent groups of workers because the marginal productivity (wages) of
each group depends on the supply of workers in the other groups. In particular, we allow native
and migrant workers to be imperfect substitutes in production, even if sharing the same education
and experience levels as in Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Manacorda et al. (2006). In addition,
and in contrast to those papers, we also allow for a further degree of imperfect substitutability
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ immigrant workers, where ‘new’ (old) migrants are deﬁned as those who
are observed working in Germany for ﬁve years or less (strictly more than ﬁve years). Moreover,
to account for the institutional frictions existing in the German labor market, we investigate not
only the wage eﬀects of immigration but also the employment eﬀects, since in an imperfect labor
market employment would be an important margin of adjustment to shocks in the presence of rigid
wages.
Our results provide a full picture of the adjustment of the Western German labor market to
migration in the period from 1987 to 2001. In terms of employment, we ﬁnd negative eﬀects of
new immigrants on previous immigrants, while we do not ﬁnd evidence of such eﬀects on native
workers. Our estimates suggest that, for any ten new immigrants in the German labor market, three
to four old immigrants are driven out of employment, whereas no native is aﬀected. Reinforcing the
evidence of stronger competition between new and old immigrants rather than between immigrants
and native workers, we also ﬁnd an imperfect degree of substitutability between natives and new
immigrants, whereas new and old immigrants are close to perfect substitutes. In particular, we
estimate a signiﬁcant elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants of around 20 (close
to what Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Card (2009) ﬁnd between native and immigrants in the US)
and an elasticity of substitution between new and old immigrants of around 60 and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the one implied by perfect substitutability.
3In terms of wage eﬀects, our estimated elasticities imply that over the period 1992-2001 new
immigrants to Western Germany reduced the average wages of long-term immigrants by 0.5%, with
highly educated long-term immigrants losing around 1.1% of their wages. Approximately half of
the negative wage eﬀect on the highly educated was due to immigration from Eastern Germany.
As for the eﬀects of new immigration on natives, there is essentially a null average eﬀect: negative
on highly educated (-1%) and close to zero or positive on the less educated and on those with
vocational education. We conclude the paper with some simple calculations in which we use our
estimated elasticities to discuss the aggregate costs of immigration in the presence of wage rigidities
compared to the case of fully ﬂexible wages and no negative employment eﬀects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 brieﬂy outlines the relevant features
of the history of immigration in Germany and reviews the relevant related literature. Section 3
describes the theoretical framework behind our evaluation of the wage and employment eﬀects
of immigration. Section 4 presents the data used for our econometric analysis, describes the
reﬁnements aimed at making the data best suited to analyze the labor market eﬀects of immigrants
and presents summary statistics. Results from the econometric analysis of the employment eﬀects
of immigration are presented in section 5, which also discusses important empirical issues and
estimates the substitutability between natives and migrant workers across skill groups, using these
estimates to calculate the equilibrium eﬀects of immigration on employment and wages. Section
6 discusses the implications of our ﬁndings in terms of the aggregate costs of immigration with or
without wage rigidity. Section 7 concludes.
2 Immigration to Western Germany and Related Literature
After World War II, Western Germany experienced two large ﬂows of immigrants. First, during
the 1950’s and 1960’s, the country experienced a large inﬂow of Turks and Southern European
(mostly unskilled) workers with no German background. Then, during the early 1990’s, so-called
ethnic Germans (individuals with German ancestry returning from abroad), and Eastern Germans
moved ”en masse” to Western Germany.4
The ﬁrst inﬂow of foreign workers began in the mid-1950s. In that period the recruitment
of guest workers coming mainly from South and South-East European countries started. Guest
workers were poorly skilled workers recruited for a limited period of one to two years and then
required to return to their countries of origin. The inﬂow of foreigners steadily increased during the
Cold War period until the 1973 oil crisis, when the economic downturn induced the government to
4For a detailed description of immigration ﬂows in Germany and for a survey of empirical results of its labor
market impact see Zimmermann et al. (2007).
4ban the recruitment of workers from abroad. According to the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce,
in that year foreign population accounted for around 6.4% of Western Germany’s total population.
Notwithstanding the ban on the recruitment of guest workers, the foreign population remained
constant, thanks to family reuniﬁcations for those workers who managed to settle permanently in
Germany.5
After the end of the Cold War, Germany resumed the temporary migration policy, mainly at-
tracting workers from Central and Eastern Europe. Over the eleven years following the reuniﬁcation
in 1990, more than 2 million Germans moved from the East to the West (Statistisches-Bundesamt-
Deutschland, 2006a). Another parallel immigration ﬂow of ethnic Germans involved 2.8 million
people between 1988 and 2001 (Statistisches-Bundesamt-Deutschland (2006b)). Ethnic Germans
are a peculiar group of immigrants because they have German nationality but, since they lived
abroad for a long period (often more than one generation), their knowledge of the German language
and of German habits is not comparable to that of natives. For example, according to Federal
Administration Oﬃce data reported in Bauer et al. (2005), 62.6% of the ethnic Germans applying
for admission to Germany between July 1996 and April 1999 failed the German language test. In
the words of Zimmermann (1999), “ethnic Germans are basically facing the same diﬃculties with
social and economic integration as foreigners”. Overall, in 2001 7.3 million foreigners accounted
for 8.8% of the total German population.
The present paper is related in its approach to the recent literature that analyzes the impact of
immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives of diﬀerent skills (education and experience)
popularized by Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2008) for the US
and applied by Manacorda et al. (2006) to the analysis of immigration to the UK. Bonin (2005)
applies a skill-based analysis of immigration to the German labor market. His approach, however,
is a reduced-form one. He identiﬁes the partial eﬀect of immigration on wages of each skill group
but, since he does not specify a structure of labor demand and supply he cannot identify the
total eﬀects of immigration on wages and employment. Moreover, the analysis deﬁnes immigrants
simply as foreign nationals in the IAB and therefore omits the very important inﬂow of Eastern
Germans and Ethnic German immigrants.
Following the working paper version of the present paper (D’Amuri et al., 2008), other studies
have analyzed the impact of immigration on the employment and wages of West Germans. Those
studies have either used somewhat diﬀerent data (such as the GSOEP used in Felbermayr et al.
(2008)) or focused on somewhat diﬀerent policy experiments (as Brucker and Jahn (2008)). While
5Even if guest workers were formally allowed to spend only a limited time period in Germany, this provision
was not eﬀectively enforced. Moreover, no recruitment halt was possible for foreign workers coming from European
Community countries.
5generally conﬁrming our results those studies provide interesting extensions, robustness checks and
alternative policy analyses which complement the present article.
3 Theoretical framework
To analyze the wage and employment eﬀects of immigration in Western Germany we use a frame-
work similar to the one Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Borjas (2003) adopted to analyze immigra-
tion to the US. Output is produced using a combination of physical capital and a labor composite
of groups of workers diﬀering in their education, age and national origins. The wage paid to each
group is equal to its skill-speciﬁc marginal productivity.
To ﬁtt h es i g n i ﬁcant ﬂexibility of the US labor market, Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Borjas
(2003) assume that wages always adjust to clear the labor market so that the inﬂow of new
immigrants is entirely absorbed by wage changes. In the context of the German labor market,
however, an additional and potentially relevant margin of adjustment is constituted by changes
in employment due to the presence of some degree of wage rigidity. For this reason, we augment
the original setup of Ottaviano and Peri (2008); Borjas (2003) with elements used by Saint-Paul
(1996), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) as well as Angrist and Kugler (2003) to study the eﬀects of
labor market regulation.
3.1 Production
As in Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Borjas (2003), ﬁrms employ labor and physical capital (K)t o
produce a homogeneous ﬁnal product, which is sold in a perfectly competitive market and is taken
as numeraire good. Technology is such that physical capital and a labor composite are combined in
a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce output under constant returns to scale. The labor
composite is itself a CES aggregator of employees with diﬀerent work experience nested within
educational groups. We allow for further degrees of imperfect substitutability between natives





where the subscript t indicates the time period, Yt is output, At is total factor productivity (TFP),
Kt is physical capital, Lt is the CES aggregator of diﬀerent types of employees and α ∈ (0,1) is












6where Lkt is itself a CES aggregator of employees with educational level k and θkt are education-
speciﬁc productivity levels standardized such that
P
k θkt = 1. Workers are grouped in three
educational levels, k =1 ,2,3, corresponding to workers with no vocational degree, workers with
a vocational degree and workers with tertiary education. The parameter δ>1m e a s u r e st h e
elasticity of substitution among the three educational groups.
As in Card and Lemieux (2001), workers with the same education but diﬀerent work experience















where j =1 ,2,...,8 is an index capturing ﬁve-year intervals of potential experience, spanning a
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 40 years. The term η>1 measures the elasticity of substitution
between workers with the same education but diﬀerent potential experience and θkj are their
education-experience-speciﬁc productivity levels, standardized such that
P
j θkjt =1 . F o l l o w i n g
Ottaviano and Peri (2008), native and immigrant workers are allowed to be imperfect substitutes in
production since the two groups may have diﬀerent abilities and skills which aﬀect their comparative














where Hkjt and Mkjt denote, respectively, native (‘Home’) and immigrant (‘Migrant’) workers;
σ>1 is their elasticity of substitution; θHkjt and θMkjt are their speciﬁc productivity levels, with





















kjt ) denotes migrants with education k and experience j who are observed
working in Western Germany for ﬁve years or less (strictly more than ﬁve years). In (5) the
parameter λ>1 denotes their elasticity of substitution while θOLD
kjt and θNEW
kjt represent their
speciﬁc productivity levels standardized so that θOLD
kjt + θNEW
kjt =1 .
In all expressions, the relative eﬃciency parameters, θ, and the total factor productivity, At,
depend on technological factors only and are thus independent of the supply of migrant workers.
3.2 Wage Rigidity
We account for wage rigidities by assuming that the wage of natives with education k and experience
j has to satisfy the following reduced-form constraint:
Hkjt =[ wHkjt(1 − r)]
ξH Hkjt (6)
7where Hkjt is the native labor force, wHkjt is the native wage rate, ξH > 0 measures the elasticity
of native employment with respect to wages, and r ≥ 0 is the unemployment insurance replacement
rate.
Expression (6) captures the fact that native employment and the uninsured portion of the wage
they receive are linked. Hence a change in wages (produced by a change in the supply of some










where ξM > 0 measures the elasticity of immigrant employment with respect to their wage. The
elasticities ξH and ξM are allowed to be diﬀerent for natives and immigrants.
Whereas the native and old immigrant labor forces are static, the population of new immigrants
is subject to exogenous shocks. In particular, since new immigrants appear in our dataset only
upon ﬁnding their ﬁrst job in Germany, we assume that the employment of new immigrants MNEW
kjt
coincides with their level in the labor force M
NEW
kjt . Accordingly, MNEW
kjt is exogenous whereas
Hkjt and MOLD
kjt are determined as wages adjust to the inﬂow of MNEW
kjt .
The theoretical underpinnings of (6) and (7) are simply stated. If there was unemployment
in a perfect labor market, unemployed workers would bid the wage down until labor demand met
labor supply. In (6) and (7) that happens when ξ = 0. Theories of unemployment suggest reasons
why this mechanism fails to operate. Three main reasons have been highlighted in the literature
(see, e.g., Romer (2001), for a survey). First, in eﬃciency-wage theories the equilibrium wage is
above its market clearing rate because higher wages raise the productivity of labor. When, for
instance, workers tend to shirk and monitoring is imperfect, unemployment allows ﬁrms to enforce
workers’ discipline. The resulting ‘no-shirking condition’ gives rise to a positive relation between
employment and wages consistent with ξ>0 in (6) and (7). Second, whereas in eﬃciency-wage
theories ﬁrms do not want to cut wages to prevent workers from shirking, in contracting theories
ﬁrms would like to cut wages but they cannot, due to some explicit or implicit agreement with their
workers. This happens, for example, in ‘insider-outsider’ models that distinguish between ‘insider’
workers, whose interests are taken into account at the time of bargaining, and ‘outsider’ workers,
whose preferences are, instead, irrelevant. Greater insider power increases (outsider) unemployment
by raising the contracted wage and forcing ﬁrms to move up their demand schedules. The resulting
positive relation between wage and employment is again consistent with ξ>0 in (6) and (7). Third
and last, relations like (6) and (7) can also be generated by the so-called ﬂow approach to labor
markets according to which, when confronted with the pronounced heterogeneity of workers and
jobs, the idea that their matching up occurs through markets is inherently ﬂawed. Workers and
8ﬁrms will meet, instead, through a complex process of search and matching. From this viewpoint,
however, wages are not set according to Walrasian labor demand as in (8), (9), the reason being that
search and matching implies that the value of a ﬁlled job deviates from the marginal productivity
of labor.
3.3 Labor Market Equilibrium
In equilibrium wages and employment levels are such that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts (i.e,. they are on
their labor demand curves) and the two constraints (6) and (7) bind. The production function (1)
can be used to calculate the demand for each type of labor at a given period t.S p e c i ﬁcally, proﬁt
maximization requires that the natural logarithm of the wage of native workers with education k
and experience j equals the natural logarithm of their marginal productivity in units of output:

























where κt = Kt/Lt is the capital-labor ratio. Similarly, the natural logarithm of the wage of old








































kjt )( 9 )
Aggregating the marginal pricing conditions for each education-experience group implies the




























where Wkjt = wMkjt(Mkjt/Lkjt)+wHkjt(Hkjt/Lkjt) is the average wage paid to workers in the
education-experience group k,j and can be considered as the compensation to one unit of the
composite input Nkjt.
Aggregating the production function one level further, together with marginal cost pricing,

























Wkjt is the average wage in education group k.6
In calculating the eﬀects of new immigration on wages, we will take into account that physical
capital adjusts to changes in the labor supply so as to keep its real rate of return constant. This is
a reasonable assumption since Ortega and Peri (2009) recently found that within OECD countries
physical capital fully adjusts to immigration within one year, in order to maintain constant returns
to capital. This implies that in expressions (8) and (9), the capital-labor ratio κt follows a trend
determined only by the growth of total factor productivity At so that the overall impact of new
immigration on native and old immigrant wages can be obtained by computing the total changes
of (8) and (9) with respect to the changes in the labor aggregates (Lt,L kt,L kjt) induced by new
immigrants. This yields the expressions (18) and (20) reported in Appendix A, which enables us
to calculate the wage eﬀects of new immigration once we know the corresponding employment
responses (calculated as 19) and the estimates for δ,η,σ and λ based on (8), (9), (10) and (11).
4 Data and Empirical Implementation
In this section we present our dataset, we discuss its pros and cons and we detail some procedures
used to clean and reﬁne the data in order to make them as representative as possible. We also
present some summary statistics and preliminary evidence on immigration and on natives’ and
immigrants’ employment and wages.
4.1 The IAB Employment Subsample
The data we employ are from the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB).7 The ad-
ministrative dataset spans the period 1975-2001 and covers all employment spells subject to social
security taxation and the unemployment spells during which the individual received unemployment
beneﬁts. The population includes workers and trainees liable to make social security contributions.
The self-employed, civil servants and students enrolled in higher education are not included in the
dataset. Hence the dataset is representative of people with a stable job who are not self-employed,
and it excludes groups with high turnover and who are on the margins of the labor markets. Ac-
cording to Bender et al. (2000), in 1995 the IAB data cover nearly 79.4% of all employed individuals
in Western Germany, but the coverage varies across occupations and industries (coverage levels are
not declared). The data we use are an annual 2% random sample of the overall relevant population
6T h ew e i g h tf o rt h ew a g eo fe a c hg r o u pe q u a l st h es i z eo ft h ec o m p o s i t ei n p u tf o rt h a te d u c a t i o n - e x p e r i e n c ec e l l ,
Lkjt, relative to the size of the composite input for the whole education group Lkt.T h i si sm e a s u r e db yt h es h a r e
of group k,j in educational group k.
7The interested reader can also refer to Bender et al. (2000) for a detailed description of the data.
10for a total of around 400,000 employment spells per year.
The IAB dataset is well suited for the analysis of labor market outcomes in the German labor
market, especially for people with high attachment to the labor market such as male heads of
households. It has been largely used to inquire into issues related to German wages and employ-
ment. One major advantage of this data is the very large, consistent and continuous coverage
over time: it records more than 20 million employment spells between 1975 and 2001. For each
employment spell, all the relevant information regarding the employees is collected by the em-
ployer and reported directly to the social security agencies. Measurement error is therefore kept
to a minimum. The transmission of all the relevant information to the employment agency is
mandatory, so that there are no issues arising from non-response. At the same time the sample is
representative of the whole (social-security-paying) labor force each year in the sample. An alter-
native dataset reporting information on wages, employment and immigration status is the German
Socioeconomic Panel Study (GSOEP)8. While that panel study has some desirable features, such
as the identiﬁcation of country of birth (which is better than nationality in identifying immigrants)
and a complete history of employment which allows calculation of eﬀective experience, it also has
two serious problems, in our view. The ﬁr s ti st h a ti ti sb a s e do nam u c hs m a l l e rs a m p l es ot h a ti n
many education-experience cells (according to our deﬁnition) it contains very few observations or
none at all, especially for immigrants. This makes it very hard to construct representative measures
of wage and employment by cell. Second, it is a panel data set started in 1984 with infrequent
refreshments (1994, 1998 and 2000). Hence the data (wages and employment) on new immigrants
is only included infrequently. During the intermediate years only the sample weights are adjusted
to reﬂect the changing population but no new information on ﬂows and wages is used. Since our
analysis focuses on new immigrants and on their eﬀects on relative wages and employment, this
seems a major limitation. Therefore we decided to use the IAB dataset and to address a series of
issues by reﬁning and cleaning the data (as described below). In the end we have an aggregate,
representative dataset that we can compare to the GSOEP (see section 4.2 below) with a much
larger number of observations in each cell. This allows more precise measures of cell employment
and wages used in the regressions.
4.2 Data reﬁnements
The IAB dataset has some limitations. We try to carefully address each one of them to produce a
dataset that is as good and as representative as possible for our purposes. In Table 1 we compare
systematically some summary statistics obtained from our reﬁned dataset with summary statistics
8For a full description of this dataset see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005)
11from the GSOEP for years 1987, 1991 and 2001 which represent the initial, an intermediate and the
ﬁnal year for our empirical analysis. While, as stated above, the GSOEP dataset is also imperfect
it is helpful to see some systematic diﬀerences between the two and whether they are likely to bias
our results.
A ﬁrst limitation of the IAB data is that there are no recall questions on the working history
of each worker prior to the date of entry in the dataset. As a consequence it is not possible to
reconstruct the exact work experience of an individual, and so we impute it. In so doing, we
follow the standard assumption that potential experience is equal to the worker’s age minus the
typical age at which she is expected to have completed her education (Borjas (2003))9. While this
method can introduce some error, Table 1 shows the comparison of population mean and standard
deviation of imputed experience (IAB) with actual experience from the GSOEP (worker history is
available in these data). There is usually less than one year diﬀerence in the averages and standard
deviations for both natives and immigrants.
A second and, for our purposes, more severe limitation of the IAB data is that for immigrants
neither the place of birth, nor the year of arrival in Western Germany are recorded. What is
available for each individual is the exact nationality at the country level. Since the focus of this
paper is on immigration rather than nationality, this requires further assumptions about the link
between the former and the latter. In particular, we assume that workers that declare at least
once to be foreign nationals are immigrants. Hence, people who naturalize during the period
under consideration (notice that since 2000 the naturalization laws have become less strict) are
still considered immigrants. Also, there are very few people naturalized before 1975. On the
other hand, the presence of a large second generation of immigrants with foreign nationality may
produce an over-count of the number of immigrants. However, since we identify most of our eﬀects
from the changes in a cohort of immigrants, the presence of a constant group of second generation
immigrants will not aﬀect the estimates much. Moreover, our main results are unaﬀected when we
instrument total migrants’ shares using only Germans who moved from the East to the West after
reuniﬁcation, a recent ﬂow of migrants for which the second generation group should be negligible.
Besides workers with foreign nationality we also identify two other groups as immigrants: German
workers who migrated from the East t ot h eW e s ta f t e rr e u n i ﬁcation (and are recorded as Eastern
German by the IAB); and Ethnic German workers, who primarily immigrated from Eastern Europe
and who constitute a very large share of recent immigrant inﬂows. As they are an important group
9The age of entry in the labor force is assumed to be 16 for high school dropouts with no vocational education,
19 for high school dropouts with vocational education or high school graduates without vocational education, 21 for
high school graduates with vocational education, 24 for those who completed non-university higher education and
25 for workers who hold a university degree.
12that would be missed by looking at the nationality variable only, we account for them using an
external source of data. Our procedure (described in detail in Appendix B) accounts for the
inﬂows of ethnic Germans across years and country of origin assuming that within year-of-arrival
and country-of-origin their education and age characteristics are similar to those of the other
foreign-born from that country. The procedure may systematically alter the education structure of
ethnic immigrants if for each country of origin regular immigrants are systematically more educated
than ethnic Germans. This is possible since it was easier for less educated ethnic Germans to enter
Western Germany. We conﬁrm in three diﬀerent ways that this potential mis-classiﬁcation does not
alter our ﬁndings. First, we run some regressions using the ”imputed” education of immigrants
obtained from their occupation-industry rather than from their schooling. If ethnic Germans
are systematically less educated they would choose appropriate occupations and the imputing of
education should address this problem. Second, we specify some regressions omitting the ethnic
Germans’ imputation to see if it drives the results. Third, we compare the educational distribution
of immigrants between our data and the GSOEP. Table 1 shows that our data in 2001 produce
a lower share of highly educated than the GSOEP. This would argue against any upward bias
introduced by imputing. While certainly imperfect, we think that our procedure uses the available
data in its most eﬃcient way and does not seem to introduce a systematic bias in the results.
After these imputations we compare the share and characteristics of immigrants (including
ethnic and Eastern Germans) in the IAB and in the GSOEP (see Table 1). Notice again that their
share in total employment is similar (in the IAB we have if anything a slight over-count) and their
gender, experience and educational distribution are very close, except for a much larger share of
highly educated immigrants in 2001 according to the GSOEP. As this over-representation of the
highly educated in the GSOEP is also present for natives it may be worth inquiring as to the cause,
but it should not aﬀect the procedures by which we impute immigrants.
At h i r dr e ﬁnement on the data is that we impute the daily wage data which are right censored
by the upper limit of the social insurance contribution in the IAB. Right censoring occurs in around
2% of the spells. Censored wages are imputed using the estimated wage values obtained from a
Tobit regression model. This is run separately for each year and includes the following independent
variables: experience, experience squared, educational attainment, nationality, 17 sector dummies
and 131 occupational dummies. Table 1 shows that the average wages in IAB are 10 to 15% higher
for all groups relative to those in GSOEP, and their standard deviation is similar in the two groups.
Af o u r t hr e ﬁnement that we use in some regressions is to allow for educational downgrading. Im-
migrants, in fact, may accept jobs requiring a lower level of qualiﬁcation than they have(Dustmann
et al., 2007). In this case the reported level of education can be a poor indicator of the labor market
13position of immigrants, decreasing the precision of our stratiﬁcation of workers across education-
experience cells. In order to address this problem, we group native and immigrant workers ac-
cording to reported education as well as according to ‘adjusted’ educational levels. In particular,
similar to Card (2001) and Card (2007), for each available year we run an ordered Probit regres-
sion for the native population with the reported level of education as the dependent variable and
17 sector plus 131 occupational dummies as independent variables. This regression estimates, for
each worker, the probability of having each of the possible educational levels, given his position in
the labor market. Out of sample predictions are obtained for all immigrant workers and for those
natives who failed to report their educational level and should otherwise have been dropped from
the sample. The corresponding densities, averaged across individuals in each year, are then used
to calculate weighted employment and wage levels for our education-experience cells. While this
correction should improve the homogeneity of workers’ skills within the group, it is more subject
to endogeneity bias as immigrants may adjust their occupation in Germany according to sector
demand. For this reason, we only use it as a robustness check.
Finally, to obtain a representative sample of days worked in a year in the economy (not just a
total employment count), in each relevant year we include men aged 17 to 64 who were working
and receiving salary income on the 1st of July.10 The probability of working that day (and hence
being in the sample) is proportional to the number of days worked in a year. Hence the probability
works as a weight for each worker by days worked. The number of hours worked per day is another
possible dimension to look at. Unfortunately, daily hours worked are not reported in this dataset.
Nevertheless, EULFS data11 show that part-time employment accounts for a small share of total
male employment in Germany, and its yearly variations are controlled for by the year dummies
which we employ in our regressions. Nominal gross wages are all converted to 2000 Euros using
the CPI-based deﬂator across years.
Our analysis focuses on the period 1987-2001. During this period an extremely large inﬂux of
immigrants (including Eastern Germans and ethnic Germans) substantially increased the share of
non-Western German workers in the Western German labor force. Figure 1 reports the share of
immigrants in the labor force as obtained from the reﬁned IAB dataset, showing that it climbed
from about 9% in 1987 to 14% in 2001. The time period analyzed is particularly interesting for the
analysis of the labor market impact of immigration: the inﬂow of immigrant workers was very large
and in large part supply-driven (due to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the uncertainty following
the aftermath of socialism in the countries of origin). Indeed, the large and sudden rise in the share
10As a robustness check, we also run all the regressions on the sample including both men and women.
11According to data reported in ILO (2007), the share of part-time workers in total employment in Germany has
never been above 5 percent in the period 1991-2001.
14of immigrant workers, mostly due to push factors, makes this somewhat of a ‘natural experiment’—
one which is well suited to assessing the impact of immigration on incumbent workers.12
4.3 Stylized Facts and Descriptive Statistics
Let us ﬁrst describe simple aggregate evidence that points to the existence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in labor market performances between immigrants and natives. Figure 2 shows the evolution of
the share of individuals receiving unemployment beneﬁts relative to the total workforce, calcu-
lated separately for native Germans and immigrant workers for the period 1987-2001 from the IAB
dataset. Two tendencies emerge. First, the rates for native German and immigrant workers are
quite stable and fairly similar over the period 1987-1991, a period of relatively small inﬂows of
immigrants. Second, beginning in 1991 the unemployment rate for immigrants increases signiﬁ-
cantly. For native Germans it increases much less, opening a gap that is quite persistent, though
it narrows toward the end of the 1990’s.
Table 2 reports, for selected years, the shares of immigrants in each of the education-experience
cells used in the regressions. As always we reclassify the ethnic Germans as immigrants following
the procedure described in the previous section and in Table 2 we show the percentage of non-
Western Germans both from foreign countries and from Eastern Germany. The share of the
non-native workforce in total employment more than doubles in many cells between 1987 and
2001. Large inﬂows of immigrants took place in all education groups. Interestingly, while the
Eastern German immigrants were over-represented among those of intermediate and high levels
of educations, the immigrants from foreign countries were proportionally more numerous among
the less educated group. Merging the two groups we obtain a group of immigrants which is fairly
balanced among the three education groups. This is part of the reason why we do not ﬁnd large
relative wage shifts as a consequence of immigration.
To summarize, a preliminary look at the data suggests that there has been a substantial increase
in the number of immigrant workers over the period of observation. While this increase has been
quite evenly distributed across educational levels, the labor market performance of migrants has
been worse compared to natives in terms of unemployment rates. This may suggest stronger
competition of new immigrants with existing foreign-born workers in terms of employment. The
following econometric analysis will investigate this hypothesis.
12Bauer et al. (2005), p. 217, provide descriptive evidence on the independence between the growth of foreign
employment and the business cycle after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
155E m p l o y m e n t a n d W a g e E ﬀects
The aim of the present section is to estimate the employment and wage responses of old immigrants
and natives to the arrival of new immigrants, building on the theoretical framework detailed in
section 3. We proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the eﬀects of new immigration on the
employment levels of native and old immigrant workers in the same skill group. Second, from the
production function (1) we derive empirical speciﬁcations that allow us to estimate the various
elasticities of substitution. In particular, we estimate the elasticity of substitution between natives
and immigrants for given education and experience (σ) as well as the elasticity between new and
long-term immigrants for given education and experience (λ). We then estimate the elasticity
of substitution between educational levels (δ) as well as between experience levels for a given
educational level (η). Finally, once we have the estimated employment eﬀects and elasticities
of substitution, we use expressions (18) and (20) to compute the impact of the inﬂow of new
immigrants on the wages of natives and old immigrants with diﬀerent levels of education.
5.1 Empirical Issues: Demand Shocks and Estimation Bias
Before implementing the empirical speciﬁcations let us note that a common feature throughout the
estimation procedure is that we consider changes in the employment of new immigrants as a labor
market supply shock. In particular, when we estimate either the employment response of previous
immigrants and natives, or the response of wages we rely on the assumption that the inﬂow of
new immigrants is an exogenous supply shock. Therefore, (i) we can consider the employment
response of natives as actually caused by the immigrant inﬂow and (ii) we can consider the wage
responses as identifying the relative wage elasticity (elasticity of substitution) of labor demand.
This may look like a strong assumption. After all we are essentially regressing (total) employment
on immigration and wages on immigration and we may be identifying a parameter that mixes
demand and supply changes. We think, however, that considering the estimated parameters in
section 5.2 as genuine measures of the employment response, and those in section 5.3 as demand
elasticities, is reasonable in light of the following three facts.
First, and least important, the entire literature which analyzes the national eﬀects of immigra-
tion using this framework makes the same simple assumption that immigrants are an exogenous
shock to the national labor supply (e.g. Borjas (2003); Borjas and Katz (2007); Ottaviano and
Peri (2008)).
Second, while the overall ﬂow of immigrants can be driven by demand pull, since we use
variations and control for year, education and experience ﬁxed eﬀects we rely on the diﬀerential
change of immigrant ﬂows within an education-experience cell. This is likely to be driven mostly
16by demographic factors in the sending country (i.e., the size of a cohort relative to the others).
Moreover, in all the elasticity regressions we use relative native-immigrant wages and relative
native-immigrant employment 13 so that any demand shock speciﬁc to education and experience
groups will aﬀect both natives and immigrants and would be cancelled when taking the ratio.
Third, and most important, in our estimates we also rely on an IV strategy based on a quasi-
natural experiment: the German reuniﬁcation. In the aftermath of the reuniﬁcation (1991) a
large increase in Eastern German immigrants was observed which was simply due to the fact that
migrating became a possibility. Hence, treating the inﬂow of Eastern Germans as a pure supply
shock, post-1991, we perform several 2SLS estimations using that ﬂow as an instrument for all
new immigrants. Notice, ﬁnally, that if some demand shock, not controlled for, were still driving
part of the correlation (between relative wages and relative supply of new immigrants) it would
bias our estimates of the inverse elasticity of substitution towards 0. Hence, particularly for the
elasticity of substitution between native and immigrants, our estimates (around 0.04-0.05) could
be a lower bound of the actual inverse elasticity, which would imply even lower substitutability
between native and immigrants and certainly less than perfect substitutability.
5.2 Employment Eﬀects
We ﬁrst estimate the response of long-term immigrants’ and natives’ employment levels to the in-
ﬂow of new immigrants in the same education-experience cells. Such an adjustment in employment
(if it takes place) reveals the presence of wage rigidities and frictions that must be accounted for
when analyzing the eﬀect of immigration on wages.
5.2.1 New and Long-term Immigrants
Following a standard speciﬁcation (see, e.g., Card (2007)), we assess the possible employment eﬀects
of new immigrants on long-term immigrants by regressing the increase in the total employment of
immigrants (new plus long-term) in skill cell k,j, denoted as ∆Mkjt, on the increase in employment
due to new immigrants in the same cell, denoted as ∆MNEW
kjt . To obtain scale-independent changes
we standardized both changes by the initial level of employment of immigrants in the skill group
Mkjt−1. We consider as “new immigrants” those in the country ﬁve years or less and as “old









13Or new/old immigrant wage and employment ratios.
17In expression (12) Dk, Dj and Dt are, respectively, education, experience and year ﬁxed eﬀects
included in order to control for systematic diﬀerences in employment growth across education
groups, experience groups and years. The term ukjt is a zero mean cell-speciﬁc random shock.
Since the data used are yearly data, the coeﬃcient γ captures the short-run employment eﬀect
of recent immigration on the employment of previous immigrants. A value of γ =1i m p l i e s
that an inﬂow of new immigrants with education k and experience j equal to 1% of the initial
employment in that cell is associated with an increase in total immigrant employment within the
same education-experience cell of 1%. In this case, new immigrants add to previous employment
without crowding out any old immigrants so there is no response of employment of old immigrants
to inﬂows of new immigrants. In contrast, an estimated value of γ<1 implies that new immigrants
crowd out the employment of old immigrants inducing a decrease in their employment.
Table 3 reports the estimates of the coeﬃcient γ from estimating equation (12). Diﬀerent
columns show estimates from diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Column (1) reports the basic speciﬁcation:
Least Squares estimates, weighting each cell by the total employment in it, spanning the period
1987-2001, including males only in the sample and considering the sum of Eastern Germans, for-
eign nationals and ethnic Germans born abroad as immigrants. Speciﬁcation (2) omits the ethnic
German imputation, speciﬁcation (3) includes both men and women in the sample. In speciﬁca-
tion (4) we assign workers to education cells according to their imputed education (computed as
described in section 4.2). Speciﬁcations (5) and (6) restrict data to subsamples that omit the very
early years (pre-uniﬁcation) or recent years (post-monetary union). Finally the last two columns
(7) and (8) estimate the coeﬃcient γ using 2SLS with the ﬂow of Eastern Germans as an instru-
ment for total immigrants. Most of the point-estimates of γ are between 0.6 and 0.7, and in all
cases the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient is one can be rejected at standard conﬁdence levels against
the alternative γ<1. This constitutes evidence that new immigrants are crowding out long-term
immigrants. The estimates of γ are the lowest when using the 2SLS method, implying the largest
crowding out. Notice that the ﬁrst stage reveals that the inﬂow of Eastern Germans is a pow-
erful instrument (F-test above 200, well above the lower bound of 10 suggested by the literature
on weak instruments (Bound et al., 1995; Stock and Yogo, 2002)). In the post-1991 period, the
inﬂow of Eastern Germans represented a very sizeable group among new immigrants. A formal
test cannot reject the hypothesis that WLS and 2SLS estimates are identical. This suggests that,
i fw eb e l i e v et h a tt h ei n ﬂow of Eastern Germans was mainly a supply shock, the largest part of
the immigration ﬂuctuations are supply-driven once we control for year and cell ﬁxed eﬀects. Our
estimates for γ imply that, on average, when 10 new immigrants join the German labor force, 3 to
4 old immigrants lose their jobs.
185.2.2 Immigrants and Natives
To estimate the impact of immigrants on the employment of native workers, we use an empirical
speciﬁcation similar to (12) and based on the theoretical model in section 3. In particular we
estimate the coeﬃcient ρ in the following regression:
∆EMPLkjt
EMPLkjt−1




Using the notation from the model, the variable EMPLkjt−1 = Mkjt−1 + Hkjt−1 is total employ-
ment (immigrants plus natives) with education k and experience j at time t−1a n d∆EMPLkjt =
[(Mkjt + Hkjt) − (Mkjt−1 + Hkjt−1)] is its variation from t − 1t ot.T h ev a r i a b l e sDk,D j and Dt
are the usual education, experience and time dummies and ukjt is a zero mean cell-speciﬁc random
shock. The parameter ρ captures the impact of immigration on total employment. If it is smaller
than 1, it implies that new immigrants crowd natives out. If it equals 1, new immigrants have no
impact on native employment.
Table 4 presents the estimates of the coeﬃcient ρ. The diﬀerent speciﬁcations across columns
of Table 4 mirror those of Table 3. In this case, however, while the estimates are quite imprecise,
they are all around, and in fact above, one. We can never reject the hypothesis of ρ = 1 at any
signiﬁcance level and even the point estimates seem to rule out the possibility of crowding out.
The 2SLS estimates, while they are very imprecise in part because the inﬂow of Eastern Germans
is not as good an instrument for the change in employment of total immigrants as it was for new
immigrants, conﬁrm this result. All in all, the estimates in Table 4 do not provide any support
for the idea that changes in immigrant employment crowd out employment of native Germans.
These results seem to preclude the presence of adverse employment eﬀects of new immigrants
on natives even in the short run (as we use yearly observations). To further check this result,
we run another regression (not in the Table) in which we stratify native and migrant workers
according to their education only, instead of using the ﬁner stratiﬁcation of education-experience
cells. If Western German employers valued diﬀerently the work experience acquired inside and
outside Western Germany, our labor market segmentation along education and experience levels
could fail to appropriately identify groups of workers competing for the same jobs. Also, if there
are employment eﬀects spilling across experience groups one would not capture them with the










j EMPLkjt−1, Mkt =
P
j Mkjt−1 and ukt is a zero mean education-speciﬁc
shock. This regression controls for education ﬁxed eﬀects (Dk) as well as education-speciﬁc trends
19(Trendk) and is estimated using the usual samples. The point estimate of ρEDU in the basic
speciﬁcation is 1.48 (standard error 0.51) so that we cannot reject ρEDU =1 . The limit of this
regression is that it is run on 45 observations only.
All in all, the results from employment regressions imply that w ec a nr u l eo u tt h ep r e s e n c eo f
adverse eﬀects of new immigration on the employment levels of native workers, while long-term
immigrants seem negatively aﬀected by newcomers14. Moreover, since the time horizon is one year
(short-run) and labor markets were somewhat rigid in Germany during the period the lack of
an eﬀect on natives seems to imply a strong segmentation of the labor market, possibly due to
diﬀerences between immigrants (‘outsiders’) and natives (‘insiders’).
5.3 Elasticities of Substitution
We now turn to the estimation of the elasticities of substitution. The empirical evidence discussed
so far highlights the presence of diﬀerent employment eﬀects of recent immigration on the German
labor market: signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on old immigrants and no eﬀects on native employment.
These diﬀerences seem to conﬁrm that immigrant workers compete more between themselves than
with natives, even within groups of similar observable skills. Indeed, if the only relevant variables
for identifying similar workers were their education and experience, we would not observe diﬀerent
employment eﬀects. In line with this consideration, the theoretical framework outlined in section
3 allows for imperfect substitutability in production between natives and immigrants as well as
between old and recent immigrants. It also suggests how to estimate the elasticities of substitution
between these groups of workers.
5.3.1 New and Long-term Immigrants
In order to estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants, we use the logarithmic wages
given by expression (9) for old immigrants and its analogue for new ones. Taking the ratio within


























Essentially we allow the relative new/old immigrant productivity to depend systematically on
their education, age and on the year. We interpret the remaining within-cell variation of migrants
14These results are consistent with those obtained using a similar framework by Peri (2007). His analysis of the
impact of migration on the California labor market stressed the absence of any signiﬁcant employment eﬀects of
migrants on natives.
20over time as being supply driven. The response of relative wages identiﬁes the inverse elasticity
of substitution between new and old immigrants. The corresponding estimates are reported in
Table 5. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations check the robustness of results to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the
sample, of immigrants, and of the education groups. Speciﬁcation (1) adopts the basic speciﬁcation
described above, speciﬁcation (2) does not include the imputed ethnic Germans among immigrants.
Speciﬁcation (3) includes men and women in the sample, speciﬁcation (4) includes only people
who worked full time during the year (meaning for at least 40 weeks) and speciﬁcation (5) groups
workers according to their occupation-industry imputed schooling. Finally speciﬁcations (6) and
(7) consider two sub-samples and (8) and (9) adopt 2SLS as the estimation method using Eastern
European immigrants as an instrument for total immigrants. The estimates are quite precise and
consistent across speciﬁcations. The point estimates of the inverse elasticity are around 0.01 with a
standard error also close to 0.01. In most cases we can reject a value for the inverse elasticity larger
than 0.03. Hence no evidence is found in any speciﬁcation of imperfect substitutability between
new and old immigrants. Thus, new and old immigrants are perfectly substitutable, λ = ∞ and
all immigrants belonging to each education-experience group (Mkjt = MOLD
kjt + MNEW
kjt )c a nb e
considered as forming a homogeneous group of workers, which is what we assume in the remainder
of the analysis.
5.3.2 Natives and Immigrants
Following the same strategy outlined in the previous section, we estimate the degree of substi-
tutability between native and immigrant workers within education-experience cells. Speciﬁcally,
we regress the logarithm of the relative wages of natives and immigrants on their relative employ-
ment levels with education, experience and year ﬁxed eﬀects to control for relative demand and















Following the same type of speciﬁcations as in Table 5 we obtain a range of estimates of 1/σ.A l l
columns now show signiﬁcant values between 0.03 and 0.06 with standard errors around 0.01 and
never larger than 0.02. While the values are not too large, they systematically indicate a degree of
imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants. These estimates are perfectly in line
with what Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Card (2009) estimate for the US (a value around 0.05),
and are somewhat smaller than the values estimated for the UK by Manacorda et al. (2006), which
range between 0.1 and 0.2. While small, these elasticity values, coupled with the large increase
in immigrants relative to natives in most groups, delivers signiﬁcant eﬀects on the relative native-
21immigrant wage ratio. In particular, consider that the percentage of immigrants in Germany went
from 9 to 14% between 1987 and 2001, implying an increase in the Mt
Ht ratio for the aggregate
economy of 64%. This would imply, using the median estimate of 0.045 as the inverse elasticity,
an increase in the wage of natives relative to immigrants of 0.045*0.64=2.8%. Hence, combining
the two pieces of evidence revealed by the regressions in Tables 4 and 6 we uncover a small but
signiﬁcant degree of imperfect substitutability between native workers and immigrant workers on
the German labor market.
5.3.3 Across Experience and Education Groups
Following the implications of the model in section 3 we can use the expressions (10) and (11)
to estimate 1/η and 1/δ, the inverse elasticity of substitution between experience and education
groups. In particular, following Ottaviano and Peri (2008) we implement regressions (16) and (17)
below:








The dependent variable is the log average wage in the education-experience group (Wkjt)o ri n
the education (Wkt) group. In (16) we control for an education-speciﬁct i m et r e n d( TimeTrendk)
and for year (Dt) and experience (Dj) ﬁxed eﬀects, while in (17) we use time dummies and
education-speciﬁct i m et r e n d s( TimeTrendk) to control for the change in cell-speciﬁc productivity.
In both regressions we allow for a zero-mean disturbance. Instrumenting for the change in the cell
labor-composites, b Lkjt and b Lkt, with the inﬂow of immigrants (assumed to be supply-driven once
we control for the ﬁxed eﬀects), we can obtain consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients 1/η and 1/δ.
Table 7 reports the estimates of 1/η, which are between 0.31 and 0.33. In column (1), the
supply index b Lkjt is constructed using a CES aggregator of native and immigrant employment
with 1/σ=0 .046. In column (2) the supply index is the simple sum of native and immigrant
employment. Similarly, Table 8 presents the estimates of 1/δ which range between 0.34 when the
supply index is constructed as a CES aggregate and 0.37 when the supply index is constructed as
the sum of employment across education cells. These estimates imply an elasticity of substitution
between education groups of around 2.9 and across experience groups of 3.3. The ﬁrst is a bit
larger than the corresponding estimates for the US (usually ranging between 1.5 and 2.5) and the
second is slightly smaller than its US counterpart, usually estimated around 5 (see, e.g., Card and
Lemieux (2001)). On the other hand, using a comparable sample Brucker and Jahn (2008) report
22estimated values for the parameter1/δ close to 0.3. While this is similar to ours, they estimate a
lower value of 1/η around 0.06. The elasticity across age groups, however, does not play much of a
role in our simulations in which we aim at characterizing the wage eﬀect across education groups
and between natives and immigrants. Hence, we use our estimated elasticity 1/η in simulating
the wage eﬀects of immigration and reassure the reader that using the Brucker and Jahn (2008)
elasticity estimates of 1/η would give essentially identical results.
5.4 Wage Eﬀects
Based on the theoretical framework of section 3 and, in particular, on the implied expressions (18)
and (20) reported in the appendix, we are now able to evaluate the total impact of immigration
on the wages of native and old migrant workers. In so doing, we rely on the employment eﬀects
estimated in section 5.2 and the elasticities of substitution σ, λ , η and δ estimated in section
5.3. Section 5.4.1 analyzes the impact of the inﬂow of new immigrants between 1992 and 2001 on
average wages and the total wage income of long-term (pre-1992) immigrants15. Then section 5.4.2
focuses on the impact of the same ﬂow of immigrants on wages of native workers. We choose 1992
as a watershed because German migrants from East to West are reported in the dataset starting
with that year.
5.4.1 Wage Eﬀects on Long-Term Immigrants, 1992-2001
The eﬀects of new immigration on the wages of long-term immigrants are given by expression (20).
This allows us to compute the overall impact of post-1992 immigration on the wages of pre-1992
immigrant workers taking into account both the degree of substitutability between diﬀerent groups
of workers (δ, η, σ and λ)a n dt h er e s p o n s eo fe m p l o y m e n tt oi m m i g r a t i o nﬂows (γ). Following
Ottaviano and Peri (2008) we also assume that the adjustment of capital to the inﬂow of immigrants
is fast enough that the simulations obtained for full capital adjustment (to keep return to capital
constant) are a good approximation for the actual eﬀect experienced year-by-year in the economy.
Table 9 reports the simulated wage eﬀects of immigration obtained using the average point
estimates for the elasticity parameters, namely δ =2 .9,η=3 .3,σ=2 1 .5,λ=5 8 .1a n dγ =0 .69.
The terms on the right hand side of formula (20) in Appendix A can be sorted into three groups:
each square bracket on the right hand side of (20) contains three groups of terms. The ﬁrst
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capture the wage eﬀect of the employment change of old immigrants in response to the inﬂow
15We deﬁne as post-1992 (pre-1992) immigrants who appear in our dataset 1992 or later (strictly before 1992).







capture the wage eﬀect of a change in employment of natives in
response to immigrants. This second group of indirect eﬀects, however, is essentially zero in light
of the results of Table 4 which reveal no employment response of natives to a change in immigrant
employment. In Table 9 the direct and indirect eﬀects of new immigrants are denoted by A and B,
respectively. The table shows the direct, indirect and total wage eﬀects of new immigration from
Eastern Germany (columns 1-3), from the rest of the world including Ethnic Germans (columns
4-6) and the total eﬀects, obtained by adding A and B (columns 7-9). Notice, intuitively, that
the indirect eﬀects, driven by the reduced employment of old immigrants, attenuate the negative
wage impact of new immigrants on previous immigrants. This is because the reduction in old
immigrants’ employment is a partial oﬀset for the increased supply of new immigrants.
Column (9) of Table 9 shows that the overall eﬀects of ten years worth of new immigration
on the wages of old immigrants are negative, implying an average loss for the pre-1992 immigrant
workers of 0.5% of their real wage. This is not a particularly large number for two reasons:
ﬁrst, the inﬂow of new immigrants between 1992 and 2001 increased the share of foreign-born
in employment by only 2.2 percentage points, which is a 20 percent increase in the initial level;
second, the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants, while not inﬁnite, is fairly
l a r g es ot h a tt h ee ﬀect of new immigrants on wages spreads in part to natives too. Old immigrant
workers with a high level of education suﬀer the largest wage losses (-1.11%), which is explained
by the fact that post-1992 immigration to Western Germany is relatively high-skilled, mainly due
to Eastern Germans (see in column 1 the direct eﬀect of Eastern German immigration on wages
of the highly educated). The comparison between columns 7, 8 and 9 reveals that the reduction
in the employment levels of old immigrants, in response to immigration, attenuates the negative
impact of immigration on the wages of those who keep their job by 0.78% on average, and by 1.5%
for the highly educated.
Decomposing the overall wage eﬀect with respect to the origin of immigrants, column 3 shows
that immigration from Eastern Germany accounts for almost half of the negative wage eﬀect
for highly educated workers while it accounts for none of the negative eﬀect on less educated
workers. This is due to the fact that Eastern German immigrants are on average more educated
than immigrants from the rest of the world. Thus, including Eastern Germans in the analysis
contributes to a more balanced picture of the eﬀect of immigrants to Western Germany, rather
than focussing only on foreign immigrants (as is done in Felbermayr et al. (2008)).
All in all, Table 9 shows that the wage response of old immigrants to new immigrants is not
too large. This leads us to inquire more carefully into the employment eﬀect and to quantify it in
24terms of aggregate wage income lost. One way of doing this is to consider the eﬀect of immigration
on the wage bill of old immigrants. Table 10 reports the simulated eﬀect of immigration 1992-2001
on the total wage bill of old immigrants. Such eﬀect combines the decrease in employment and the
decrease in the average wages of each worker who keeps her job. Combining employment and wage
losses Table 10 reveals that immigration from Eastern Germany reduced the total wage bill of old
immigrants by 5.7% and immigration from the rest of the world by 11.9%. Again, immigration
from Eastern Germany mostly penalized the highly educated, while immigration from the rest of
the world had a more balanced eﬀect. Overall, the wage bill of old immigrants was reduced by a
substantial 17.6%, and this loss was mainly driven by lost employment. These simulations already
suggest that the imperfect labor market adjustment of wages, and the implied loss in employment
for long-term immigrants were the most costly consequence of immigration. In particular, such an
employment response, combined with generous unemployment beneﬁts (as we will illustrate below)
constituted a large burden on the German welfare system. The question is whether the aggregate
cost of employment losses (lost production) and unemployment beneﬁts is larger than the cost
in terms of wage losses that old immigrants would have experienced in a ﬂexible labor market in
which wages would have adjusted to absorb the full inﬂow of immigrants without a reduction in
the employment of old immigrants. These calculations will be performed in section 6
Summarizing the ﬁndings of this section, we can say that new immigrants penalized old im-
migrants primarily in terms of employment, and only a small amount by decreasing their wages.
In terms of wages, old immigrants with high education and old immigrants with no vocational
education were the groups hurt the most.
5.4.2 Wage Eﬀects on Natives, 1987-2001
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of immigration on native wages, we use expression (18). Following our
ﬁndings in sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.2, we impose the absence of employment eﬀects for natives (ρ =1 )
as well as imperfect substitutability between native and immigrant workers.
Table 11 reports the simulated wage eﬀect for natives with three diﬀerent educational attain-
ments over the period 1992-2001. In the ﬁrst column we report the results when we consider
imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants and in column 2 we report, for refer-
ence, those obtained assuming perfect substitutability between natives and immigrants. As in most
speciﬁcations of Table 5 we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inverse elasticity 1/σ, though we prefer the results of
column 1 which uses the average estimated value for σ equal to 21.5. With imperfect substitutabil-
ity, column (1) shows no average impact of immigration on native wages over the period 1992-2001.
Across educational levels, relatively low educated workers experience a moderate improvement in
25their wage levels (+1.68%), while highly educated ones suﬀer a small loss (-1%). This is again due
to the fact that, during the period of observation, immigration to Germany (mostly from Eastern
Germany) was relatively skilled. These small wage eﬀects are consistent with the absence of neg-
ative employment eﬀects found in section 5.2.2. Moreover, even when, in column (2), we impose
perfect substitutability (σ = ∞) between natives and immigrants, the overall eﬀect on wages is
negative but still very close to zero, with the same distributional pattern across educational groups
as in the case of σ =2 1 .5.
Hence, new immigrants did not penalize native workers much either in terms of employment
or in terms of wages. Indeed, native workers with low education experienced a rise in their wages.
6 Wage Rigidity and the Costs of Immigration
The main ﬁnding of the previous section is that new immigrants did not aﬀect native workers much
in terms of either employment or wages, while they did have a negative impact on old immigrants,
mostly in terms of employment and only a little in terms of wages.
In this section we propose a simple calculation whose aim is to produce an aggregate monetary
amount which quantiﬁes the cost of the rigidities and unemployment beneﬁt si nt h ep r e s e n c eo f
new immigration. First, we calculate how much new immigration costs in terms of foregone output
and unemployment insurance, assuming that all old immigrants displaced by new immigrants are
indeed covered by insurance. Second, we calculate the changes that natives’ and immigrants’ wages
would undergo if wages adjusted to completely eliminate the employment eﬀects on old immigrants.
Our calculations focus on the year 2001. The results of the ﬁrst calculation are shown at the
bottom of Table 12 where all values are expressed in constant Euros at year 2000 prices. Column
(1) shows that, based on an estimate of γ =0 .69, approximately 25,600 old immigrants were
displaced by the inﬂow of new immigrants in 2001. This number of displaced workers can be
multiplied by the average yearly wage of old immigrants (equal to 25,996 as shown in column
(3)) to obtain the 665 million Euros of foregone wage income reported in column (5). On top of
this cost, the total yearly cost sustained to fund the unemployment insurance is shown in column
(4), which multiplies the number of displaced old immigrant workers by unemployment insurance
payments. Following Adema et al. (2003), these payments are set at 14,449 Euros per displaced
worker, leading to the total value of 370 million Euros. This is just a lower bound estimate of the
overall cost borne by taxpayers because the full cost should also include unemployment assistance
(for the long-term unemployed), housing beneﬁts, active labor market policies, etc. Thus, in the
presence of employment eﬀects associated with wage rigidity, in 2001 the overall yearly costs of
new immigration in foregone wages and unemployment beneﬁts was around 1 billion Euros.
26Table 13 reports what would have happened to the wages of natives and old immigrants if
the latter’s wages had been allowed to fall with no adverse employment eﬀect. Based on (18),
(20) and parameter estimates, column (3) shows that the employment eﬀects on old immigrants
would have disappeared if their average wage had fallen by 0.15% relative to its actual level, with
a corresponding rise of 0.016% in native wages.16 These percentage variations are ﬁrst multiplied
by the average yearly wages in column (2), then by the employment levels in column (1) to obtain
the overall changes in the wage bills paid to native and old immigrant workers.17 These are
reported in column (5) where old immigrants suﬀer in aggregate a wage decrease of 57 million
Euros whereas natives enjoy a wage increase of slightly less than 43 million Euros. Hence, the
immigration of 2001, with no employment response and full wage adjustment would have implied
a decrease in the total wage bill of natives and old immigrants equal to 14 million Euros. Table 13
shows also the wage eﬀect for each education group in the presence of no employment eﬀects. The
group receiving the biggest loss is that of highly educated old immigrants who would experience a
decrease of 158 Euros per year . This is to be expected, since new immigrants have been relatively
highly educated. Column 5 shows the total wage losses by education and nativity group under the
scenario of no employment eﬀect (and full wage adjustment). Column 7 shows, by comparison,
the overall costs sustained to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts for displaced immigrants (in the case
of wage rigidities) if those were funded by a tax proportional to the wage level of each worker,
thus penalizing the relatively better educated. The cost of unemployment on the employed old
immigrants and on natives is much (twenty times) larger under the scenario of wage rigidity and
unemployment insurance than in the scenario with full wage ﬂexibility and no eﬀect on employment.
To sum up, immigration seems to be much more costly when labor market adjustment happens
mostly via the employment margin rather than through the wage margin. The institutional char-
acteristics of the German labor market, such as the very generous unemployment beneﬁts scheme
(virtually open-ended, long-term unemployment assistance, ”Arbeitslosenhilfe”, was abolished only
in 2005), deteriorated the possibility of an eﬃcient absorption of the migration supply shock which
occurred in that period. This result is in line with Angrist and Kugler (2003), who argue that
the reaction of a country’s labor market to immigration depends on its institutional features and,
in particular, that more ‘ﬂexible’ labor markets are more eﬀective in absorbing the supply shocks
arising from migrant inﬂows. In recent times, a series of reforms have increased the ﬂexibility of
the German labor market. In 2002, the Job-Aqtiv Act increased the sanctions on the unemployed
for refusing a job oﬀer. Starting in 2003, the so-called Hartz reforms reduced the level, as well as
16The wages of natives rise thanks to the imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants.
17Average yearly wages are computed from our sample by multiplying the average daily wages by the average
number of days worked in a year.
27the duration, of unemployment beneﬁts, rationalized the overall social assistance scheme in order
to increase the incentives to work, further restricted the acceptable reasons for rejecting a job
oﬀer without losing beneﬁts, and liberalized employment services (Ebbinghas and Eichhorst, 2009;
Eichhorst and Kaiser, 2006). In general, the aim of these reforms was to accelerate labor market
ﬂows (Fahr and Sunde, 2006) and to increase the incentives to work. Coupled with the diﬀusion of
opening clauses from collective contracts (OECD, 2006), these reforms have increased the ﬂexibil-
ity of the German labor market and thus the capacity to deal eﬃciently with labor supply shocks
due to migration. Interestingly, in our context, among the beneﬁciaries of such ﬂexibility are the
long-term immigrants: with more ﬂexibility they can retain their jobs (not be displaced), although
at a lower wage. The beneﬁt to other citizens is in the form of lower taxes, under the assumption
that unemployment insurance is funded by a general tax.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the recently revived literature analyzing the impact of immigration within
a labor market equilibrium framework fully accounting for the interactions between production
factors (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007; Borjas, 2003; Manacorda et al., 2006; Ottaviano and Peri,
2008; Peri, 2007). With respect to this literature, we have made some methodological progress.
First, the elasticity parameters necessary to disentangle the wage eﬀects of immigration have been
estimated with higher precision, exploiting a large yearly panel of German workers and using the
large inﬂow of Eastern Germans after the fall of the Berlin Wall as an exogenous shock. Second, we
have allowed for imperfect substitution not only between immigrants and natives but also between
old and new immigrants. Third, in order to better estimate the impact of new immigrants on old
ones, we have extended the labor market equilibrium approach to allow for employment responses
driven by wage rigidities. Taking these responses into account, we have been able to distinguish
between the ‘direct eﬀect’ of immigration, which refers to the change in wages taking place for
given employment levels of natives and old immigrants, and the ‘indirect eﬀect’, which refers to
the change in wages due to changes in those employment levels.
Looking at the employment eﬀects of immigration, we have found that new immigration has
had a negative impact on the employment of old immigrants and no impact on the employment of
natives, suggesting closer competition between new and old immigrants than between immigrants
and natives as well as diﬀerent insider-outsider status of natives and immigrants. The estimated
wage eﬀects of new immigrants are on average very small for natives and small and negative for
old immigrants.
All in all, the most statistically and economically signiﬁcant impact of new immigration is
28t h en e g a t i v ee m p l o y m e n te ﬀect on old immigrants driven by wage rigidities. In a counterfactual
e x p e r i m e n t ,w eh a v eq u a n t i ﬁed the implications of such rigidities in terms of aggregate costs of
immigration. The calculations, based on the estimated elasticities, indicate that removing the
negative employment eﬀects of new immigration on old immigrants would cause small wage losses
to old immigrants but would save much more, in the aggregate, on unemployment beneﬁts. If
workers fund the unemployment beneﬁts with taxes, the savings in taxes more than compensate
their wage losses.
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32A Derivation of Wage Eﬀects
As discussed in section 3.3, the overall impact of new immigration on wages paid to native workers
is obtained by computing the total change of equation (8) with respect to the changes in all the
labor aggregates (Lt,L kt,L kjt) induced by new immigrants in the various education and experience
















































































i(wMmitMmit + wHmitHmit) is the share of total
wage income paid to migrant workers of education k and experience j in year t and sHkjt is the
share of wage income paid to native workers in the same education-experience group. Similarly,




i(wMmitMmit + wHmitHmit) is the share of wage income
paid to all workers of education k and experience j in year t, skt is the wage share paid to all
workers with education k in year t, and so on. The ﬁrst double summation captures the cross-
eﬀects of immigration in groups of any education-experience level, the second summation captures
the eﬀects of immigration in groups with the same education at all experience levels, and the third
and fourth summations capture the eﬀects of immigrants within the same education-experience
group.
The term ∆Mkjt/Mkjt =( Mkjt+1 − Mkjt)/Mkjt represents the change in the supply of im-
migrant workers with education k and experience j between t and t + 1. Analogously, the term
(∆Hkjt/Hkjt)response represents the change in labor supply of native workers in the same group
caused by immigration. These terms account for the employment eﬀects of immigration that arise
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fap o s i t i v er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w een native and old immigrant workers’ wages and































33Taken together with (18), expressions (19) imply that employment eﬀects will have conse-
quences for the impact of immigration on wages. A complete analytical solution of the eﬀects
of immigration on wages would require substituting expressions (19) into (18) and then solv-
ing for ∆wHkjt/wHkjt as a function of the change in new immigrants ∆MNEW
kjt /M NEW
kjt only.
That would lead to a reduced form dependence of wages in each group on immigration, incor-
porating demand and supply parameters. In our empirical implementation, however, since we
can observe ∆Hkjt/Hkjt and ∆MOLD
kjt /M OLD
kjt we estimate empirically their supply response to
∆MNEW
kjt /M NEW
kjt (see equation 13) and then include this estimation into (18).
















































































































































Hence, once the parameters δ,η,σ and λ are estimated and once we know the employment
responses of old immigrants and native workers to new immigrants, we are able to calculate the
wage eﬀect of immigration for each group.
B Imputation of Ethnic German Immigrants
A worker is considered as Western German if her nationality is German and if she has always
been working in Western Germany. All the others are considered as immigrants. Eastern Ger-
mans, in particular are considered as immigrants. They are identiﬁed as individuals with German
nationality who started working in the East and then moved to the West within the considered pe-
riod. Foreign migrants are individuals who have a non-German nationality or are ethnic Germans
coming from abroad. Particular attention is devoted to identifying the ethnic German group of
immigrants. These are immigrants mostly from Eastern European countries and, as discussed in
section 2, tend to behave just like other immigrants from those countries. However, they are barely
distinguishable from Western German nationals in the data set. With the end of the Cold War a
large number of ethnic Germans (slightly less than 3 million over the period 1989-2001, according
to Bundesverwaltungsamt (2003)) previously living in Eastern Europe moved to Western Germany,
34settling there permanently.18 After having successfully applied for a visa in the German embassy
in their country of origin, those immigrants were allowed to enter Germany, enjoying unrestricted
rights of German citizenship upon arrival.
Since in the IAB dataset only nationality identiﬁers are reported, we are not able to distin-
guish ethnic German workers from Western German workers in the individual records. However,
omitting their inﬂows would distort our analysis, especially as they were correlated over time with
immigrants from Eastern Germany and from other foreign countries. Indeed, ethnic Germans were
mostly born abroad and were not able to speak German ﬂuently on their arrival, hence they were
in all respects more comparable to immigrants than to Western German nationals. As reported in
section 2, the perception is that “Ethnic Germans are basically facing the same diﬃculties with
social and economic integration as foreigners” (Zimmermann, 1999) and, therefore, they should be
considered as foreign immigrants in our context.
We estimate the total inﬂow of ethnic Germans in each education-experience-year group and
then identify the impact of such an inﬂow (together with those of Eastern Germans and foreigners)
on the employment levels and wages of previous immigrants and native Germans. To construct the
estimates, we merge diﬀerent sources of information. First, we obtain Ext, the total yearly inﬂow of
ethnic Germans by year of arrival t and country of origin x from Bundesverwaltungsamt (2003) and
Statistisches-Bundesamt-Deutschland (2006b), respectively. Then, from the IAB data we retrieve
the exact information on the characteristics and labor market performance of foreign immigrants
coming from the same set of countries in the same year of arrival as ethnic Germans.19 Finally,
we assume that, for country of origin x and year of arrival t, the educational and age composition
of ethnic Germans is identical to that of foreign immigrants and that, within education-experience
cells, ethnic Germans and foreign immigrants from the same country of origin have exactly the
same labor market performance in terms of employment levels and wages. For example, we consider
ethnic Germans who migrated to Western Germany from the Czech Republic in 1994 as exactly
mirroring the observed and unobserved characteristics of the group of Czech citizens migrating to
Western Germany in the same year.
Speciﬁcally, as a ﬁrst step, for each of the major ethnic Germans’ countries of origin x and each
year t,w ec o n s t r u c tfxkjt = Mxkjt/Mxt as the share of immigrant workers with education k and
experience j in the total immigrant ﬂow. Notice that the total inﬂow of immigrants from country
x and year t, Mxt is obtained from Bundesverwaltungsamt (2003) and Statistisches-Bundesamt-
Deutschland (2006b) while the number in each education-speciﬁcg r o u pMxkjt is taken from the
18See Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) for an analysis of the labor market integration of ethnic German workers.
19The countries are: Czech Republic, Slovakia, former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Roma-
nia.
35IAB. Hence the share fxkjt corrects for the employment/population ratio and allows us to impute
employment in each group from the total population of immigrants. We then calculate the imputed
number of immigrant ethnic German workers from country x with education k and experience j
in year t as:
Extkj = Extfxtkj.
Since the inﬂows of ethnic Germans and foreign immigrants from a speciﬁcc o u n t r yx can be highly
volatile, our second step is to smooth the imputed values by taking averages over two consecutive
years. We then attribute to each group Extkj the average wage of foreign immigrants coming from
t h es a m ec o u n t r yx i nt h es a m ey e a rt and with the same education and age. After those two steps,
we obtain a complete education-experience distribution of employment and wages for the ethnic
German immigrants by country of origin x and year of arrival t. Summing across diﬀerent years of
arrival (starting with 1987) and countries of origin, we ﬁnally obtain the employment levels within
education-experience cells for each year. Similarly, the cell-speciﬁc wages are reconstructed using
a weighted average of average wages by country of origin and year of arrival. As a ﬁnal step, we
subtract the imputed employment levels by cell from the analogous cells of the native Western
German population and we add them to the immigrant population.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Comparison between IAB and GSOEP, Year 1987, 1991 and 2001 
 
      1987  1991  2001 
    GSOEP  IAB  GSOEP  IAB  GSOEP  IAB 
      Mean S.  D.  Mean  S.  D.  Mean  S.  D. Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean S. D. 
Share Females  0.40     0.42     0.40     0.43     0.46     0.44    
No Vocational Education  0.21    0.26     0.25    0.22     0.16    0.18    
Vocational Education  0.66    0.68     0.65    0.71     0.64    0.71    
Higher Education  0.12    0.06     0.10    0.07     0.20    0.11    
Years  of  experience  17.73 11.77 16.90  11.28 17.69 11.40 17.67  11.10 19.58  10.60 19.52 10.72
Less than 20 years of pot. 
Exp 0.59    0.62      0.60    0.60      0.53    0.53     
Natives 
Daily  wage  64.74 39.39 68.87  33.25 65.31 42.16 75.09  33.56 73.78  46.97 79.15 39.37
Share of total  0.07     0.09     0.12    0.10    0.13     0.14    
Share Females  0.30    0.31     0.33    0.33     0.40    0.37    
No Vocational Education  0.61    0.62     0.66    0.59     0.29    0.38    
Vocational Education  0.36    0.34     0.31    0.37     0.46    0.54    
Higher Education  0.03    0.04     0.02    0.04     0.25    0.08    
Years of experience  20.59  10.75 18.64  10.15 20.37  11.98  18.22  10.69 17.88  11.09  18.68 10.56
Less than 20 years of pot. 
Exp 0.46    0.54      0.47    0.56      0.61    0.58     
Immigrants 
Daily  wage  56.78 21.25 68.54  26.75 54.32 22.25 70.83  29.10 65.77  44.97 71.85 32.87
 
 
Note: The German Socio-Economic Panel GSOEP is a panel of individuals started in 1984 with refreshments (i.e. inclusion of new waves of 
people) in 1994/1995, 1998 and 2000 over the considered period. The IAB is an administrative dataset including all workers contributing to social 
security. Immigrants are defined as foreign-born plus those living in East Germany in 1989 in the GSOEP and as foreign-nationals plus those who 
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Table 2 



















Up to 4  7.2%  8.8%  1.0%  7.8% 
5 to 9  20.6%  22.9%  2.9%  20.0% 
10 to 14  20.1%  42.5%  3.7%  38.8% 
15 to 19  24.7%  39.3%  3.4%  35.9% 
20 to 24  32.4%  35.7%  2.5%  33.2% 
25 to 29  38.1%  27.9%  3.0%  24.9% 




35 to 40  16.4%  33.7%  1.5%  32.2% 
Up to 4  4.9%  15.4%  5.0%  10.4% 
5 to 9  4.0%  18.2%  5.5%  12.7% 
10 to 14  4.2%  14.1%  4.9%  9.2% 
15 to 19  5.5%  11.1%  3.8%  7.3% 
20 to 24  7.7%  9.6%  3.8%  5.8% 
25 to 29  4.9%  8.4%  3.3%  5.1% 
30 to 34  3.4%  9.1%  2.7%  6.5% 
Vocational 
Education 
35 to 40  2.8%  8.7%  1.9%  6.8% 
Up to 4  4.8%  13.7%  3.8%  10.0% 
5 to 9  4.3%  8.9%  3.0%  5.8% 
10 to 14  5.7%  7.9%  2.9%  5.0% 
15 to 19  7.5%  7.7%  2.8%  4.9% 
20 to 24  6.4%  8.2%  2.9%  5.4% 
25 to 29  4.3%  9.4%  2.8%  6.5% 
30 to 34  4.2%  10.1%  3.3%  6.8% 
Higher 
education 
35 to 40  0.0%  10.0%  2.9%  7.1% 
 
Note: The percentages are calculated from IAB data refined as described in the 
main text. Immigrants are defined as foreign-nationals and foreign-born ethnic 
Germans. East-West Germans are those workers who report having started to 
work in East Germany.   39
Table 3 




Note: Dependent variable is the yearly change in total immigrant employment in an education-experience cell as a percentage of initial immigrant 
employment in the cell; the explanatory variable is the change in new immigrant employment as a percentage of the initial immigrant employment. 
Each regression, weighted by the number of workers in the education-experience-period cell, includes education, experience and year fixed effects. 
Each observation point is an education-experience cell in a year. In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by 
education-experience group.  
*** significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 
 
 










































H0:  γ =1 
0.004 0.005 0.001 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.00  0.00 
Period 1987-2001  1987-2001 1987-2001  1987-2001 1992-2001  1987-1999  1992-2001  1992-2001 
Group Males  Males  Males  and 
Females 
Males Males  Males  Males  Males 
Ethnics' imputation  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Equivalent education  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations 313  313  313  313  210  271  210  210 
First stage                 
East-West migrants              1.01  1.00 
Standard error           0.04 0.07 
T statistic           25.42  14.47 
F-test of exclusion              163.40  209.42   40
 
Table 4 



























Note: Dependent variable is the yearly change in total employment in an education-experience cell as a percentage of the initial employment in the 
cell; the explanatory variable is the change in immigrant employment as a percentage of the initial employment. Each regression, weighted by the 
number of workers in the education-experience-period cell, includes education, experience and year fixed effects. In parenthesis we report the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors,  clustered by education-experience group.  
***, **, * different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level. 
Column 











































T  statistic  3.310 3.393 1.967  3.151  2.416 3.728  2.640 2.640 
P-value: 
H0: ρ=1 
0.487 0.412 0.965  0.415  0.603 0.529  0.097 0.089 
Period  1987-2001 1987-2001 1987-2001  1987-2001  1992-2001 1987-1999 1992-2001 1992-2001 
Group 
Males Males  Males  and 
Females 
Males Males  Males  Males  Males 
Ethnics' imputation  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Equivalent  education No No No Yes  No No  No No 
Observations  359 359 359  359  240 311  238 238 
First  stage             
East-West migrants              1.29  1.23 
Standard error           0.17  0.17 
T statistic           7.58  7.34 
F-test of exclusion              57.38  53.91   41
Table 5 




























Note: dependent variable is the relative new/old immigrant wages in an experience-education cell, explanatory variable is the relative new/old 
immigrant employment in the cell. Each regression, weighted by the number of workers in the education-experience-period cell, includes education, 
experience and year fixed effects.  In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by education-experience group.  




























2SLS,  no 
ethnic 
Imputation
Estimation  method OLS  OLS OLS OLS  OLS OLS OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
 


























Group Males  Males  Males and 
Females  Males Males Males Males Males  Males 
Ethnics' imputation  Yes  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
Equivalent education  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Wages of FY work. 
only No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations  313  313 313 313 313 210 313 210 210 
First stage                            
East-West migrants                       0.66  0.67 
Standard error                       0.05  0.05 
T statistic                       12.10  13.85 




































2SLS,  no 
ethnic 
Imputation 
Estimation  method  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 































2001  1987-1999 1992-
2001  1992-2001 




Males Males  Males  Males Males  Males 
Ethnics'  imputation  Yes No Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  No 
Equivalent  education  No No No No Yes No  No  No  No 
Wages of FY work. 
only*  No No No  Yes  Yes No  No  No  No 
Observations  359 359 359 359 359  240  359  238  238 
First stage                            
East-West migrants                       0.80  0.80 
Standard error                       0.05  0.05 
T statistic                       16.24  17.29 
F-test of exclusion                       263.67  298.86 
Note: dependent variable is the relative native/immigrant wages in an experience-education cell; the explanatory variable is the relative 
native/immigrant employment in the cell. Each regression, weighted by the number of workers in the education-experience-period cell, includes 
education, experience and year fixed effects.  In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by education-
experience group.  
***, **, * different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level.   43
 
Table 7 






















Note: Dependent variable is the average daily wage in real terms for the education-experience group. In column (1) 
the explanatory variable is log of Lkj obtained as a CES composite of natives and immigrants for a value of 1/σ 
=0.046. In column (2) the explanatory variable is the log of the Lkj obtained as the simple sum of native and 
immigrant employment.  The method of estimation used is 2SLS using as instrumental variable for ln(Lkj) the 
variable ln(Mkj), that is the log of immigrant employment in the cell. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust 
clustered at the education-experience level. Regressions are weighted with the number of workers in each cell. 




 Column  (1) 
Using the model to 
calculate (Lkj) as a CES 
composite 
(2) 
Lkj  calculated as simple 
employment counts 






T statistic  2.69  2.50 
Education trend  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies     
Experience Dummies  Yes  Yes 
























Note: Dependent variable is the average daily wage in real terms for the education group. In column (1) the 
explanatory variable is log of Lk obtained as a CES composite of different experience groups for a value of 1/η 
=0.31. In column (2) the explanatory variable is the log of the Lk obtained as the simple sum of employment across 
experience groups.  The method of estimation is 2SLS using as instrumental variable for ln(Lk) the variable ln(Mk), 
that is the log of immigrant employment in the education cell. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust 
clustered at the education-experience level. Regressions are weighted with the number of workers in each cell. 
***, **, * different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level. 
Column (1) 
Using the model to 
calculate  Lk  as a 
CES composite 
(2) 
Lk   calculated as 
simple employment 
counts 






Education trend  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
























Note: Long-run simulations, assuming that capital adjusts over the period to keep the real return constant. The columns labeled “Direct 
immigration effects” show the real wage impact of a change in supply due to new immigrants, while those labeled “indirect effect” show the 
wage impact of the reduction in labor supply of old immigrants in response to new immigration.  
Parameters used for the simulation: δ=2.9, η=3.3; σ=21.5; λ=58.1; γ=0.69. 
Column  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9) 
Due to East-West movers  Due to foreigner immigrants  Total 




























Education  0.17%  -0.04% 0.14%  -1.63%  0.79% -0.84% -1.46%  0.76% -0.70%
Vocational 
Education  -0.54% 0.37%  -0.17% -0.34% 0.32%  -0.02% -0.88% 0.69%  -0.19%
Higher  Education  -1.08% 0.59%  -0.49% -1.57% 0.95%  -0.62% -2.65% 1.54%  -1.11%
























Note: Long-run simulations, assuming that capital adjusts over the period to keep its real return constant.  










(1) (2) (3) 
Education  Due to East-
West movers  Due to foreigners  Total 
No Vocational Education  -0.9%  -10.1%  -11.0% 
Vocational Education  -9.7%  -11.9%  -21.6% 
Higher Education  -14.4%  -25.1%  -39.5% 





















Note: Long-run simulations, assuming that capital adjusts over the period to keep its real return constant. 




Column (1)  (2) 
σ  21.5 Infinite 
No Vocational Education  1.68%  1.85% 
Vocational Education  -0.14%  -0.25% 
Higher Education  -1.01%  -1.26% 




Estimated effects of new immigrants on natives and old immigrants, with displacement 
 




















Unemployment insurance for displaced 
workers 25,586  14,449    369,694,682     
Foregone production  25,586     25,996     665,129,807
 

























Policy experiment: redistributive effects 
 
Column (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)=(2*3) (5=1*4)  (6)  (7)=(1*6) 


























Total Natives  8,519,550 30,917 0.016% 5.0  42,758,744 38.0 324,023,685
No vocational edu  1,448,750 18,993 -0.006% -1.2 -1,708,739 23.4 33,849,305
Vocational education  5,972,550 31,619 0.031% 9.8 58,333,987 38.9 232,310,814
Higher education  1,098,250 42,829 -0.029% -12.6 -13,866,505 52.7 57,863,566
Total Old immigrants  1,428,150 25,996 -0.153% -39.7  -56,633,145 32.0 45,670,997
No vocational edu  573,700 22,310 -0.117% -26.1 -14,951,133 27.4 15,745,620
Vocational education  747,150 26,818 -0.124% -33.1 -24,756,151 33.0 24,649,383
Higher education  107,300 39,970 -0.395% -157.7 -16,925,860 49.2 5,275,994
Total 9,947,700 30,210 -0.005% -1.4 -13,874,401 37.2 369,694,682
*The average yearly cost sustained by each type of worker to finance the unemployment insurance scheme assumed to be proportional to her 
wage. 
 
Note: Parameters used for the simulations: δ=2.9, η=3.3; σ=21.5; λ=58.1; γ=0.69. Employment is calculated as the total count of workers 
employed as of July 1
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Figure 1 




















Source: Authors’ calculations based on IAB data. Immigrants are the sum of foreign nationals plus workers who immigrated from 
Eastern Germany plus Ethnic Germans who immigrated from abroad. 
























Source: Authors’ calculations based on IAB data. The “Unemployment Insurance recipient rate” is equal to the share of individuals receiving 
unemployment benefits relative to the sum of workers and individuals receiving unemployment benefits. 